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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate-induced migration has become a global challenge. Climate change intensifies the
frequency and severity of disasters, thereby increasing the number of people displaced by extreme
weather events. Adverse climate impacts are already exacerbating patterns of human mobility, and
will do so to a greater degree in the future. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)
reports that approximately 265 million people have been displaced by natural hazards since 2008.
Over 17 million people were internally displaced by disasters in 2018 alone. While the majority of
climate migrants are displaced within their home countries, many people are forced to move abroad.
The Caribbean region is particularly at risk in relation to climate-induced migration. The ten
countries and territories worldwide with the highest average annual internal displacement per
capita are all small island developing states (SIDS), the top six of which are located in the Caribbean.
Although SIDS experience lower absolute displacement risk compared with more populous
countries like India and China, SIDS experience significant displacement relative to their population
size. For example, IDMC reported before Hurricane Dorian (2019) that 5.9% of Bahamas’ population
will be annually displaced by hurricanes. Hurricane Dorian destroyed nearly half the homes on
Great Abaco and Grand Bahamas islands. The 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season also demonstrates
the extent of displacement risk in the Caribbean; three major hurricanes of the season—Harvey,
Irma, and Maria—displaced approximately 3 million people in a single month.
While the Caribbean region is particularly susceptible to displacement risk, the region also
reveals a framework for addressing climate-induced migration; that is, Free Movement Agreements
(FMAs). FMAs are provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration schemes that liberalize
migration restrictions between participating member states. Two FMAs embedded within the (sub)regional economic integration schemes, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Organisation
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), granted displaced Caribbean nationals important protection
benefits after catastrophic hurricanes.
During the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, CARICOM and OECS FMAs i) provided disaster
displaced persons a right of entry in other islands; ii) supported the waiver of travel document
requirements where documents had been lost or damaged; iii) granted indefinite stays to some
disaster displaced persons, facilitating permanent resettlement; and iv) eased access to foreign labor
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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markets through a mutual recognition of skills scheme and/or a waiver of work permit requirements.
The benefits that the CARICOM and OECS FMAs provided supported migrants in gaining stability
after sudden-onset disasters, and will be formalized going forward.
The application of FMAs in post-disaster contexts is possible in other regions. More than one
hundred countries worldwide participate in FMAs like CARICOM and OECS. FMAs can facilitate
migration prompted by both slow- and sudden-onset disasters and provide access to rights of entry,
work, and resettlement to climate migrants. FMAs therefore offer a protection stop-gap in the
absence of a governing legal framework for addressing climate-induced migration. Although recent
international processes like the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Sendai Framework for the Disaster
Risk Reduction have underscored the importance of climate-induced migration, there is no
comprehensive multilateral framework on the issue, and international law guarantees no protection
to climate migrants who fall outside the scope of international refugee law. Regional solutions are
useful in closing this climate-induced migration protection gap.

Key Findings:
During the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, the CARICOM and OECS FMAs:
1. Provided disaster displaced persons a right of entry in other islands;


After Hurricane Maria, Trinidad & Tobago used the CARICOM FMA’s
6-month visa-free stay provision to shelter displaced Dominicans.



The Antigua, St. Vincent, Grenada and St. Lucia governments
welcomed Dominicans, making use of the OECS FMA.

2. Supported the waiver of travel document requirements where documents had been
lost or damaged;


Immigration officials admitted Dominicans in some cases without the
national identification documents, including passports, that are
typically required.



Government officials used other forms of identification, including
appearance, accent, and family networks, while prioritizing 100%
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admission of arriving Dominican nationals, and speed of registration
and entry.
3. Granted indefinite stays to some disaster displaced persons, facilitating permanent
resettlement;


The OECS FMA provides every OECS national the right to an indefinite
stay in other OECS territories which allowed disaster displaced OECS
nationals to legally resettle.

4. Eased access to foreign labor markets through a mutual recognition of skills scheme
and/or a waiver of work permit requirements;


Some displaced CARICOM nationals were able to secure work in other
CARICOM islands using CARICOM’s work scheme for skilled
nationals.



OECS automatically grants the right to work to OECS nationals in any
OECS territory, allowing displaced OECS nationals to seek work in
other islands.

FMAs should be part of the policy response to climate-induced migration in other regional
contexts because they:
1. Respond to the complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration, offering
migration benefits regardless of whether migrants are moving for climate-specific
reasons;
2. Build structural and individual resilience thereby strengthening migration as an
adaptation response; and
3.

Can be amended to address climate-induced migration without expending the
political capital necessary for global multilateral initiatives.

This white paper uses the Caribbean as a case study to demonstrate the utility of FMAs in providing
a protection framework for climate-induced migration. Other proposals for addressing climateinduced migration have not yet succeeded. A multilateral convention specifically on climateinduced migration would be difficult to design given the difficulty of linking particular instances of
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migration to a climate-related event.

Proposals for integrating climate migrants into the

international refugee regime face a similar challenge. Providing a climate passport to climate
migrants has not yet gained political traction. In contrast, FMAs should be part of the policy
response to climate-induced migration because they increase regular migration pathways for climate
migrants, can bypass the political hurdles of creating an international legal status for climate
migrants, and enhance economic resilience.
Besides making a case for FMAs as a useful addition to the set of policy tools used to address
climate-induced migration, this white paper also presents an opportunity to consider climateinduced migration in a Caribbean context, whereas most research on human mobility and climate
change in relation to SIDS has focused on the Pacific.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Climate-induced migration presents the human face of climate change. Climate change intensifies
the frequency and severity of disasters, thereby increasing the number of people displaced by
extreme weather events. 1 Adverse climate change impacts are already exacerbating patterns of
human mobility, and will do so in greater magnitude. 2 The Internal Displacement Monitoring
Center (IDMC) reports that approximately 265 million people have been displaced due to natural
hazards since 2008.3 More than 17 million were internally displaced by disasters in 2018 alone.4 The
majority of climate migrants are forced to move within their home countries, posing economic,
developmental and social challenges for their national governments. However, while the majority
of climate migrants remain within their own country, many people are also forced to move abroad.5
Cross-border climate-induced migration is a particular challenge for small island developing
states (SIDS) and low-income countries whose response capacity can be overwhelmed by slow- and
sudden-onset disasters.6 Internally displaced persons may also become cross-border migrants when
they are unable to access adequate resources. Sudden-onset disasters in the Caribbean have already
led to cross-border displacement from low- and middle-income SIDS. Hurricane Irma (2017), which
displaced more than two million people, prompted the wholesale evacuation of the island of
Barbuda.7 After Hurricane Maria (also 2017), one fifth of Dominica’s population was forced to leave
the island.8

Adger, W.N. et al. 2014. “Human Security.” In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. C.B. Field et al., 755–791. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
2 Id.
3 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Disaster Displacement: A Global Review 2008-2018 (2018).
4 Vicente Anzellini et al., “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019” (Geneva, Switzerland: Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre), accessed July 8, 2019, http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/.
5 The Nansen Initiative, “The Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in
the Context of Disasters and Climate Change,” (December 2015), available at https://perma.cc/5E8M-M3DC.
6 David Cantor, “Law, Policy and Practice Concerning the Humanitarian Protection of Aliens on a Temporary
Basis in the Context of Disasters” (2015), available at https://perma.cc/VDY5-NZ3M.
7 IDMC, 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement – the Americas (2018), available at https://perma.cc/Z5ND-JDYG;
see also Kate Lyons, The Night Barbuda Died: How Hurricane Irma Created a Caribbean Ghost Town (Nov. 20, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/QN4W-64MZ.
8 Magnus Hansen, Exodus from Hurricane-Hit Dominica as Recovery Remains Elusive (Oct. 18, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/M3E4-Z7ZX.
1
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Although recent processes like the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change have underscored the importance of addressing cross-border climate-induced
migration, international law has yet to provide a governing framework for climate-induced
migration. Furthermore, climate migrants enjoy no legal status under international law. While
international refugee law provides protection to those displaced by instances of social upheaval such
as political conflict, international refugee law does not provide protection to people solely displaced
by climate-related disasters. The absence of both a comprehensive legal framework and legal rights
creates a key protection gap for cross-border climate migrants.
This paper focuses on cross-border climate-induced migration, arguing that free movement
agreements (FMAs)—provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration schemes that liberalize
migration restrictions between participating member states—can provide protection benefits in the
absence of a governing legal framework and guaranteed legal rights. The paper leverages the
Caribbean as a case study to make this point. Part II provides an overview of the climate risks
Caribbean SIDS face, introduces the concept of climate-induced migration, and analyzes key trends
in human mobility patterns in the context of climate change. Part II also describes the legal
protection gap surrounding climate migrants who are forced to leave their home countries. Part III
offers a solution.

Drawing on examples from the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, Part III

demonstrates how FMAs offer a protection stop-gap for climate-induced migration. Two Caribbean
FMAs embedded within the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) allowed disaster displaced persons to enter, work,
and resettle in nearby Caribbean islands after Hurricane Maria. Using the Caribbean as a case study,
this paper will demonstrate how FMAs increase regular migration pathways for climate migrants.
Part IV argues that FMAs are useful in other regional contexts. FMAs can enhance individual and
structural economic resilience and bypass the political hurdles of creating an international legal
status for climate migrants, while providing a rights-responsive framework for facilitating mobility
increased by climate-related disasters.
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2. CLIMATE VULNERABILITY & MIGRATION
2.1 SIDS Climate Challenges
Climate change poses an existential threat to both Caribbean and Pacific SIDS.

The

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that increased aridity, decreased
freshwater availability and sea level rise might render several atoll islands “uninhabitable” at 1.5°C
of global warming.9 Average global temperature will increase by 1.5°C as early as 2030 at the current
rate of global GHG emissions.10 Thus several atoll islands could become uninhabitable within the
coming decades.
Impacts associated with sea level rise could also render atoll islands uninhabitable before
they are completely submerged under water. Saltwater intrusion, soil salinization, and flooding
undermine fresh water availability and agricultural capacity, elements necessary for sustaining
human life. Frequent flooding destroys housing and infrastructure, and can wipe out livelihoods.
Multiple Pacific islands have already reported increased water and food insecurity due to sea level
rise.
In the Caribbean, increasingly intense and frequent storms also pose an existential challenge.
A single extreme weather event can cause extensive economic damage, and roll back significant
development gains. Extreme weather events can also systematically disrupt infrastructure networks
and erode the provision of important services like running water and electricity.11 Hurricane Maria,
for example, caused the equivalent of over 226% of GDP in total damages and losses in Dominica,
and resulted in the failure of electricity service due to extensive damage to the transmission and

9 Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018: Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems. In: Global
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V. et al. (eds.)]. In Press.
10 IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of
global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of
strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [MassonDelmotte, V. et al. (eds.)]. World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 32 pp.
11 IPCC, 2014: Summary for policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A:
Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [Field, C.B. et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
USA, pp. 1-32.
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distribution network. 12 With increasing climate change, the frequency of such economic and
infrastructural devastation will increase.13 While sea level rise in the Pacific has come to define the
existential threat climate change poses to SIDS, an average global temperature over 1.5C above preindustrial levels also poses a significant risk to Caribbean islands. Frequent storms threaten to
render Caribbean SIDS economically inviable without significant adaptation measures.
Climate risk in the Caribbean also alters migration dynamics. Recent trends in Caribbean
migration flows show a high level of environmental migration, alongside the outmigration of skilled
professionals to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, a
disproportionate number of female migrants, and both voluntary and forced returns to the region.14
Scientists forecast that natural hazards, like tropical cyclones, heavy rains and floods, as well as
droughts and sea level rise, will have the greatest impact on climate-induced migration in the
region. 15 Indeed, sudden-onset disasters in the Caribbean have already led to increased outmigration from disaster-impacted countries. 16 For example, Hurricane Irma, the most powerful
hurricane on record in the Atlantic, displaced two million people.17 Over 8.5 million people were
displaced between 2008-2018 in 21 Caribbean countries.

18

Displacement has significant

Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria (Sept. 18, 2017),
available at https://perma.cc/8ZVZ-U6EW.
13 Oppenheimer, M. et al., 2014: Emergent risks and key vulnerabilities. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B. et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1039-1099.
14 IOM, Migration Governance in the Caribbean: Report on the Island States of the Commonwealth Caribbean 15 (2018)
available at https://perma.cc/9PL8-9K42.
15 Raoul Kaenzig & Etienne Piguet, Migration and Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean, in PEOPLE ON
THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 155, 155 (2014).
16 O.C. Andrade Afonso, Natural Disasters and Migration: Storms in Central America and the Caribbean and
Immigration to the U.S. (2011), available at https://perma.cc/2YSK-Y68G; see also J. Baez, G. Caruso, V. Mueller and C. Niu,
Heat Exposure and Youth Migration in Central America and the Caribbean, 107 AM. ECON. R.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 446
(2017); J. Baez, G. Caruso, V. Mueller and C. Niu, Droughts Augment Youth Migration in Northern Latin America and the
Caribbean, 140 CLIMATIC CHANGE 423 (2017); R.J. Nawrotzki, J. DeWaard, M. Bakhtsiyarava and J. Trang Ha, Climate Shocks
and Rural-Urban Migration on Mexico: Exploring Nonlinearities and Thresholds, 140 CLIMATIC CHANGE 243 (2017); A. Cordero
Ulate and G. Lathrop, Relaciones entre Medio Ambiente y Migraciones en República Dominicana (IOM 2016).
17 IOM supra note 14.
18 Caribbean Migration Consultations (CMC), Consultation Towards a Framework for Regional Cooperation on Human
Mobility in the Context of Disasters and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change in the Caribbean (June 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/42AB-SHH4.
12
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consequences for development, health, human and national security, and livelihoods 19 ; thus
solutions to climate-induced migration remain critical.

2.2 Defining Climate-induced migration
Although migration has long been prompted by environmental disasters, climate change
exacerbates this phenomenon.20 The risk of being displaced by a disaster has quadrupled since the
1970s.21 After correcting for population growth, the likelihood of a person being displaced by a
disaster has increased by 60% in the last 40 years worldwide.22 IDMC reports that 34 million people
were displaced by sudden-onset disasters in 2008 alone, with 56% being displaced by climate-related
disasters that year.23 While the majority of climate migrants remain within their own country, some
migrants are forced to move abroad due to both slow- and sudden- onset natural hazards.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines an environmental migrant as
“persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the
environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual
homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their
country or abroad.” 24 Although international law provides no definition for a climate migrant,
climate-induced migration falls within the sub-category of environmental migration. Indeed, like
environmental migration, climate-induced migration can describe movement that is temporary or
permanent, voluntary or forced, internal or cross-border.
Climate-induced migration occurs mostly within national borders, over short distances, with
wealthier and more educated migrants tending to cross national borders. Policy experts identify

19

World Bank, Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration (2018), available at https://perma.cc/HS6C-

7GA9.
Jane McAdam ed., CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 1 (2010).
Justin Ginetti, Disaster-Related Displacement Risk: Measuring the Risk and Addressing Its Drivers (IDMC, 2015).
22 Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Mobile Worlds: Choice at the Intersection of Demographic and Environmental Change,
43 Ann. Rev. Env’t & Res. 245, 252 (2018).
23 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the
Norwegian Refugee Council, Monitoring Disaster Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Findings of a Study of the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (OCHA,
IDMC and the Norwegian Council 2009) 8.
24 International Organization for Migration, Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment, MC/INF/288 (Nov. 1.
2007), para. 6, available at https://perma.cc/8SY6-4T72.
20
21
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five categories of movement, first described by Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer: i) migration
prompted by sudden onset disasters, for example flooding and hurricanes, which tends to be
temporary and internal; ii) slow-onset degradation, for example rising sea levels, increased
groundwater and soil salinization, which often results in permanent migration; iii) “‘sinking’ small
island states” which present a unique case of slow-onset disasters wherein rising sea levels combine
with low-lying island topography to render islands uninhabitable; iv) high risk zones that
governments declare dangerous for human habitation; and v) forced displacement due to violence,
armed conflict, or unrest because of a scarcity of essential resources like water, arable land, or
grazing grounds.25
Across all categories, adverse environmental impacts do not lead to migration in a linear
way; empirical studies have shown that many other factors play into the decision to move or stay.26
Economic, social, and political drivers shape migration alongside climate change and other
environmental indicators. 27 As the Foresight Report notes, “the range and complexity of the
interactions” among drivers “means that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for
whom environmental actors are the sole driver.”28 As a general matter, economic factors play a
larger role in determining migration outcomes than environmental drivers at both the individual
and structural level.29

2.3 Identifying the Legal Gap
A protection gap exists for migrants displaced across national borders by sudden- and slow-onset
disasters, particularly from island and low-capacity states. This protection gap arises from the fact
that international law does not confer a general right of entry for admission into a foreign country;30
although migrants who qualify for protection under refugee law or complementary measures are
25 Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative
Gaps and Possible Approaches, UNHCR, 13-7 (Feb. 2012), https://perma.cc/XGW9-5SMP.
26 DOMINIC KNIVETON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: IMPROVING METHODOLOGIES TO ESTIMATE FLOWS 6
(2008).
27 Foresight, Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities (2011), available at
https://perma.cc/GK84-7ADS.
28 Id.
29 Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change 6
(2010), available at https://perma.cc/REW8-T9PH.
30 GUY GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 94 (1977).
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protected from being rejected at the border. 31 Where displacement occurs across borders, then,
climate migrants find themselves with no right to enter another state, remain there, or be protected
against forcible return. 32 Instead, the status of these displaced persons is dependent upon the
“generosity of host countries.”33 In fact, the only situation in which international law may afford a
right of entry to climate migrants occurs when environmental drivers combine with established
grounds for protection under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee
Convention).34
The Refugee Convention extends protection to petitioners with a well-founded fear of
persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular
social group. The petitioner must also be unable to gain protection from their home country.
Although home governments may be unable or unwilling to protect those affected by climate-related
events, the narrow grounds for persecution “makes it difficult to apply” the refugee convention to
climate migrants seeking to resettle in receiving countries.35 Persecution usually requires human
agency, which climate impacts do not satisfy. 36 Furthermore, fleeing a slow- or sudden-onset
disaster does not trigger any Convention ground—race, religion, nationality, political opinion.37 To
date, no court has extended protection based on international refugee law to a climate migrant. In
the 15-year period between 2000 and 2015, Pacific Islanders argued in more than twenty
administrative and judicial cases in Australia and New Zealand that they should receive protection
under refugee law because of climate change; none succeeded.38

31 Walter Kälin, Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 81, 87 (Jane
McAdam ed., 2010).
32 Id. at 86-91.
33 Kälin supra note 31 at 90-91.
34 Id. at 92.
35 See NZ Case Teitiota – Kiribati; United Nations Convention Relating to the Satuts of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2),
opened for signature July 28, 1981, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
36 Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement, 33 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 1, 4 (2016).
37 Id. at 5.
38
Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement,
33 WINDSORY.B. ACCESS JUST. 1, 5 (2016); AF (Tuvalu), [2015] NZIPT 800859; AD (Tuvalu), [2014] NZIPT 501370; AC
(Tuvalu), [2014] NZIPT 800517–520 [AC (Tuvalu)]; Teitiota 2013, supra note 15; Teitiota 2014, supra note 14; AF (Kiribati)
2013, supra note 15; Refugee Appeal no 72719/2001, RSAA (17 September 2001) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72313/2000,
RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72314/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no
72315/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72316/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee
Appeal nos 72179–72181/2000, RSAA (31 August 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal nos 72189–72195/2000, RSAA (17 August
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For example, in Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment, the New Zealand Supreme Court found that an I-Kiribati citizen, Teitiota, did not
qualify as a refugee under international law. Teitiota sought refugee status in New Zealand because
of the effects of sea level rise and environmental degradation in his home island Kiribati.39 The Court
found that Teitiota’s case did not meet the required elements for refugee status under the Refugee
Convention because “while Kiribati undoubtedly faces challenges, Mr. Teitiota does not, if returned,
face ‘serious harm’ and there is no evidence that the Government of Kiribati is failing to take steps
to protect its citizens from the effects of environmental degradation to the extent that it can.”40 The
Court noted, however, that its decision does not mean “that environmental degradation resulting
from climate change or other natural disasters could never create a pathway into the Refugee
Convention or protected person jurisdiction.”41
In contrast, New Zealand’s Immigration and Protection Tribunal (“Tribunal”) did grant a
resident visa to a family from Tuvalu based on “exceptional circumstances.”42 In In re: AD (Tuvalu)
(2014), a family from Tuvalu sought resident visas in New Zealand. The family argued that they
would suffer if they were deported to Tuvalu because of climate change impacts. The Immigration
and Protection Tribunal found that the family had established “exceptional circumstances of a
humanitarian nature, which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to be removed
from New Zealand” pursuant to New Zealand’s Immigration Act of 2009.43 The Tribunal based its
finding partly on the fact that the family had relatives already residing in New Zealand. The
Tribunal declined to reach the question of whether climate change provided a basis for granting
resident visas in this case, although the Tribunal acknowledged that climate change impacts may
undermine the enjoyment of human rights.

2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72185/2000, RSAA (10 August 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72186/2000, RSAA
(10 August 2000) (Tuvalu). Australian cases: 1004726, [2010] RRTA 845 (30 September 2010) (Tonga); 0907346, [2009] RRTA
1168 (10 December 2009) (Kiribati); N00/34089, [2000] RRTA 1052 (17 November 2000) (Tuvalu); N95/09386, [1996] RRTA
3191 (7 November 1996) (Tuvalu); N96/10806, [1996] RRTA 3195 (7 November 1996) (Tuvalu); N99/30231, [2000] RRTA 17
(10 January 2000) (Tuvalu); V94/02840, [1995] RRTA 2383 (23 October 1995) (Tuvalu).
39 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, [2014] NZCA 173 (New Zealand).
40 Id. at para 12.
41 Id. at para 13.
42 Id. at para 30.
43 Id.
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Some regional bodies have expanded the refugee definition such that climate migrants could
qualify. The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention extends protection to persons fleeing
to another country because of “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order.”44 The 1984 Cartagena Declaration’s definition similarly includes
those who are displaced because their “lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”45 Both these frameworks have been
used in cases of environmental migration. The OAU Convention was mobilized in 2011 and 2012
by Kenya, Ethiopia and other East African countries, who accepted 300,000 Somali refugees fleeing
severe drought. 46 Ecuador used the Cartagena Declaration to admit Haitians fleeing the 2010
earthquake.47 Nevertheless, these regional interventions remain the exception, not the norm.
Scholars and practitioners have responded to the protection gap surrounding climateinduced migration by arguing for: i) the integration of disaster displaced persons into the
international refugee law framework; ii) the expansion of existing bilateral and regional protective
programs and provisions; and/or iii) the creation of new legal devices.

Early interventions,

sometimes state-backed, called for the inclusion of climate-induced migration within international
refugee law.48 Scholars have also advanced proposals for new multilateral governance frameworks
for climate-induced migration based on the 1951 Refugee Convention.49
Beyond academic debate, climate-induced migration has finally gained traction in the
international community. Starting with the Cancun Adaptation Framework, human mobility was

African Union, Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) Article 2.
Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees (1984) Conclusion III.3.
46 Walter Kälin, Interview: Deciding Whether to Migrate and Where to Go, available at https://perma.cc/MTP3-8A2U.
47 David Cantor, Cross-border Displacement, Climate Change and Disasters: Latin America and the Caribbean (July
2018).
48 Harriet Grant et al., UK Should Open Borders to Climate Refugees Says Bangladeshi Minister, THE GUARDIAN (Dec.
4, 2009, 3:55 PM), https://perma.cc/7BFC-KCR7. The Bangladeshi Finance Minister before the Copenhagen climate change
conference pushed for the revision of the 1951 Refugee Convention to include climate migrants. The Maldives made a
similar proposal earlier in 2006.
49 Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect
Climate Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60 (2010); David Hodgkinson et al., ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention
for Persons Displaced by Climate Change, 36 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 69 (2010). See also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini,
Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 349 (2009) (proposing
a multilateral treaty that addresses cross-border climate-induced migration).
44
45
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first recognized within the global climate debate under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change in 2010. 50 The landmark Paris Agreement helped build this momentum,
establishing in 2015 the Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for
Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts to “avert, minimize and address
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”51 The Global Compact on Safe,
Orderly, and Regular Migration (Global Compact on Migration) crystallized this momentum,
recognizing climate change as a unique migration driver in 2018.52
The Global Compact on Migration, the first international cooperative agreement on
migration, evolved from a concerted push towards increasing state-sponsored legal migration
pathways for climate migrants, recognizing that national and regional actors may be in a better
position to address climate-induced migration.53 Signed by over 160 countries, the Global Compact
on Migration recommends regular migration opportunities—including humanitarian visas, private
sponsorships, and temporary work permits—as levers to ensure that migration becomes an
experience of dignity rather than an act of despair.54
As the international conversation on climate-induced migration develops, FMAs should be
included in the set of policy proposals states consider. Part III introduces FMAs, and makes a case
for including them as part of the solution to climate-induced migration.

3. FREE MOVEMENT AGREEMENTS
3.1 Overview
Free Movement Agreements (FMAs) are provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration
schemes that liberalize mobility restrictions between participating member states. The agreements

50 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention (UNFCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para 14(f).
51 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 21 st session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13
December 2015, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 49.
52 The Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018), available at https://perma.cc/WZ5H-Z6XN
(“The Global Compact on Migration.”).
53 Platform on Disaster Displacement, State-Led, Regional, Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop Legal
Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES’: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE 126, 145 (Simon Berhman &
Avidan Kent eds., 2018).
54 The Global Compact on Migration supra note 52.
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range from removing visa requirements for entry into member states to more comprehensive rights
to reside and work.55 FMAs can also provide for the mutual recognition of skills and transfer of
social security rights.56 The agreements may be applied unevenly, with rights and benefits extended
to pre-defined categories of people, including migrant workers, business people, students and
refugees.57 In most regions, FMAs are linked to a common market, where free movement of goods,
services, capital and labor serve as the basis of economic integration, and workers are granted the
right to enter, work and/or settle in member states.58
The EU serves as the most well-known example, but FMAs exist across all continents, with
approximately 120 countries participating in regional arrangements that include free movement
provisions.59 FMAs proliferated with the rise of regional trade agreements.60 Africa has adopted the
largest number of FMAs, present within the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East Africa
Community (EAC), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS). 61 Asia-Pacific FMAs include the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) serve as prominent examples in Latin America and
the Caribbean.62
Rights of entry within FMAs range from relaxing visa requirements for intra-regional travel
to authorizing indefinite stays. Some agreements allow for visa free travel, although most grant a
temporary visa extension. Within Europe, for example, the Schengen Agreement authorizes visa-

55 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), MIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION xv (Phillipe de Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017).
56 Id.
57 Id. at XX.
58 Sonja Nita, Free Movement of People within Regional Integration Processes: A Comparative View, in MIGRATION, FREE
MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 3, 7 (Phillipe de Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017). The EU, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR,
and CARICOM all adhere to this rubric of free movement within a common market.
59 Vincent Chetail, The Transnational Movement of Persons under General International Law - Mapping the Customary
Law Foundations of International Migration Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 1, 35
(Vincent Chetail & Céline Bauloz eds., 2014).
60 Id. at 33-4.
61 Id.
62 Chetail supra note 59.
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free travel for citizens of member states within the Schengen Area. FMAs generally stipulate that
entry can be barred if admission would contravene public policy, public security or public health.63
Some FMAs grant residence rights, with most agreements conditioning residence on employment.64
The conditioning of residence on employment accords with the aim of most FMAs—to facilitate the
movement of labor.

Table 1: Sample of Latin American & Caribbean FMAs65
Regional
Arrangement

Period
of VisaFree
Stay
90 days

Categories
of Persons

Identification
Documents

Grounds for
Refusal of
Entry

Labor Category
Covered

Rights of Residence

CAN
nationals
and foreign
residents

Valid
national
identification
document

Immigration
regulations,
domestic
order,
national
security, or
public health

Temporary
residence for two
years, with the
possibility of
extension

Caribbean
Community
(CARICOM)

6
months

CARICOM
citizens

Travel
permits, ID
cards with
photographs,
birth
certificates,
drivers
licenses

Central
American
Common
Market
(CACM)

90 days

Citizens of
El Salvador,
Guatemala,
Honduras,
Nicaragua

National
identification
document or
passport

Security
concerns,
public
safety,
public order,
or person
likely to
become a
charge on
public funds
Public order,
national
interest, or
state
security

Individually
moving
workers,
company
workers,
seasonal
workers, border
workers, service
providers
Certain
categories of
skilled labor,
service
providers on a
temporary basis

All categories of
migrant
workers

Renewable
temporary residence
granted for a period
of 2 years;
permanent
residence must be

Andean
Community
(CAN)

Right of residence
after being granted
indefinite entry;
person must be
involved in
economic activity
and not a charge on
public funds

63 Nita supra note 58 at 11-15. The EU is an outlier in stipulating visa-free travel—most agreements grant only
temporary visa exemption.
64 Id.
65 Adapted from UNESCO supra note 55.
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Southern
Common
Market
(MERCOSUR)

90 days

MERCOSUR
citizens

Valid travel
document

NA

Service
providers,
generally all
migrant
workers

renewed every 5
years
Temporary
residence for two
years; possibility of
permanent
residence

Indeed, FMAs often address labor directly, either facilitating labor migration or granting
access to labor markets for certain categories of people, often highly skilled workers. For example,
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Regulation 1612/68 grants
nationals of EU member states the right to work in any other member state without a work permit.
This right includes equality of treatment, remuneration, and working conditions compared to
nationals of the host state.66 Similarly, Article 2 of ECOWAS grants the right of residence “for the
purpose of seeking and carrying out income earning employment,” although those making use of
the framework must apply for a residence card.67 Some FMAs follow the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) model by granting labor market access only to service providers on a
temporary basis, while others aim to protect the rights of migrant workers instead of regulating
market access.68
Some FMAs have evolved beyond their common original purpose, that is to liberalize
restrictions on the movement of labor, and have moved toward creating social citizenship. For
example, MERCOSUR, whose Residence Agreement of 2002 grants nationals of nine countries,
including Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Guyana, the right to work for two years in
another member state and the opportunity to apply for permanent residency, now aims to “promote
channels for social participation as a key way of strengthening regional integration.” 69 Mutual
recognition of skills and qualifications is one aspect of FMAs that coheres to both the economic and
social aims of these agreements, alongside social, health and labor regulations. CARICOM, for
example, allows workers to secure social security benefits from the schemes to which they have

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19. The supplementary protocol in 1986 granted the right to work.
68 Id. at 18.
69 Carla Gallinati & Natalia Gavazzo, ‘We Are All MERCOSUR’: Discourses and Practices about Free Movement in the
Current Regional Integration of South-America, in MIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 201, 202 (Phillipe
de Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017).
66
67
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contributed outside of their country of origin. The development of FMAs beyond regulating
migration of labor signals their capacity to address other types of human mobility.

3.2 A Caribbean Case Study
3.2.1. Operation in 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season
The Caribbean region demonstrates the possibility of adapting FMAs to the climate change context.
Two Caribbean FMAs embedded within CARICOM and OECS have already facilitated migration
after sudden-onset disasters, presenting an example of the benefits FMAs can potentially offer
climate migrants. During the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, the CARICOM and OECS FMAs i)
provided disaster displaced persons a right of entry in other islands; ii) supported the waiver of
travel document requirements where documents had been lost or damaged; iii) granted indefinite
stays in some cases, facilitating permanent resettlement; and iv) gave access to foreign labor markets
through a mutual recognition of skills scheme and/or a waiver of work permit requirements.
Both the CARICOM and OECS FMAs’ main goal is to support regional economic integration,
despite their utility in an environmental context.

CARICOM—a regional grouping of fifteen

member states representing 16 million people—was established by the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas
to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade.70 The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas
originally did not conceive of free movement of persons, although it did set up a common market to
promote economic integration between and development of member states.71 Since 1973, CARICOM
has developed various bodies and schemes to facilitate integration goals, the most notable of
which—the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)—permits free movement of goods,
capital and labor among member states.72 Article 45 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas sets a
goal of free movement of all member state citizens between member territories, regardless of their

Sophie Nonnenmacher, Free Movement of Persons in the Caribbean Community, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW
387 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007); Who We Are, CARICOM, https://perma.cc/G6VE-M53C (last visited Apr. 18,
2019).
71 CARICOM, Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, Art. 38 (1973), available at https://perma.cc/LM8NBLG2.
72 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 389; see also Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade
Agreements, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 23, 33-34 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds.,
2006).
70
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employment status.73 Article 46 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas provides for the movement
of skilled community nationals, which allows certain categories of workers to access CARICOM
island labor markets without a work permit.
Free movement rights can be exercised under three elements of the CSME: the movement of
skills, services, and the right of establishment.74 Skilled CARICOM nationals—including university
graduates, teachers, nurses, and artists—may apply for a Certificate of Recognition of Skills
Qualification (Skills Certificate) to work in other member states.75 The Skills Certificate does not
guarantee permanent residence, but skilled nationals may apply after admission;76 skilled nationals
may also move with their dependents.77 Service providers enjoy movement modeled on the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), but are guaranteed the same treatment as nationals while
conducting “approved activities.” 78 Meanwhile, self-employed nationals engaged in non-wage
earning activities that are commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional or artisanal can enjoy an
indefinite stay in another member state by exercising their right to establish a business or right of
establishment.79 All CARICOM nationals are entitled to 6-month visa-free stays in other member
states, unless they are deemed a threat to national security, public safety, order, or morals, or any
other basis set out by the Caribbean Court of Justice.80
The CARICOM FMA also establishes social measures to facilitate movement. Social security
benefits, for example, can be transferred between states.81 The CARICOM Agreement on Social

CARICOM, Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Art. 45 (2001) available at https://perma.cc/8HRR-QBC6.
Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 391.
75 CARICOM supra note 72 at Art. 46 (providing for the movement of skilled nationals as a step towards general
free movement within member state); see also CARICOM, Single Market and Economy, Free Movement – Travel and Work 2026 (3d. Edition), available at https://perma.cc/SUR4-NGQM.
76 CARICOM, Single Market and Economy at 34-35.
77 Id. at 36. But see Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 395 (noting that national law defines dependents according to
income tax legislation and social security schemes which leads to uneven application of right of free movement for
dependents.).
78 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 393.
79 Id. at 394.
80 CARICOM, Single Market and Economy at 35.
81 IOM supra note 14 at 19; see also Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 395 (The 1997 CARICOM Agreement on Social
Security “protects all entitlements to long-term benefits by providing for the totalization of all periods in which
contributions were paid to social security stems in Member States, and is operational in all Members.”); CARICOM, The
1994 Intra-Regional Double Taxation Agreement prevents self-employed CARICOM nationals from paying taxes twice. Agreement
Among the Governments of Member States of the Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Profits or Gains and Capital Gains and for the Encouragement of Regional Trade and
Investment (1994), available at https://perma.cc/7YSZ-GHCS.
73
74
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Security was established in 1996 to ensure that those who migrate to a member state to work, or have
worked in multiple member states, have access to benefits from social security schemes to which
they have contributed.82 The agreement covers contributory pensions for invalidity, disability, old
age, and death and survivors’ benefits. The agreement does not cover maternity or sickness benefits.
The CARICOM Protocol on Contingent Rights (“the Protocol”) also aims to support CARICOM
nationals exercising their right of establishment, provision of services, movement of capital or free
movement of skills. The Protocol extends rights to dependents, grants access to primary education,
and ensures a range of property rights.83 The Protocol is not yet in force.
Although only 10% of the collective population of CARICOM member states constitute
skilled nationals, there has been a growing number of CARICOM nationals who have migrated to
other CARICOM countries under the CSME.84 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
and Grenada all reported an increased number of CARICOM nationals with verified Skills
Certificates in their countries from 2013 to 2016. 85 Barbados verified as many as 2,166 Skills
Certificates in 2016, representing 1% of its total population. Indeed, most immigration to Barbados,
the CARICOM country which receives the highest number of skilled nationals under CSME, occurs
through legal migration pathways, and the extension of free movement protocols to new categories
of workers helps to ensure regularized movement of migrants to Barbados.86 Recently, CARICOM
expanded the categories of workers eligible for a Skills Certificate to agricultural workers and
security guards, and contemplated including domestic workers.87
OECS, established by the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981, also features a FMA that has facilitated
mobility after sudden-onset disasters. 88 OECS promotes integration between its full member
states—Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines—on matters such as foreign policy, defense and security, and
economic development. The OECS Economic Union, established in January 2011, creates a single

CARICOM, Social Security in CARICOM, available at https://perma.cc/KBF6-PG73.
CARICOM, Protocol on Contingent Rights, available at https://perma.cc/R6D2-GN67.
84 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 390.
85 Data on file with author.
86 CMC supra note 18 at 13.
87 CMC, CARICOM Labour Ministers to Meet Wednesday to Discuss Free Movement for Security Guards and
Agricultural Workers, ST. LUCIA NEWS ONLINE (Feb 5., 2019), https://perma.cc/KC4F-FSWX.
88 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 387.
82
83
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financial and economic space wherein goods, services and people move without restriction.89 Article
3 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre sets a principle of “the abolition . . . of the obstacles to the free
movement of persons, services and capital.”90 Article 12 ensures freedom of movement for OECS
nationals within the OECS Economic Union Area, including non-discriminatory access to
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment regardless of nationality.
Article 12 also provides that “citizens of Protocol member states shall enjoy in the
Economic Union Area the rights contingent to the right of freedom of movement that are agreed by
Protocol Member States.”91 These rights were articulated in the OECS Policy on Rights Contingent
to the Freedom of Movement. According to the policy, approved by OECS Heads of State in 2015,
the same general and social rights/privileges that are accorded to citizens of the host member state
should be extended to all OECS nationals and their spouses and dependents. These rights include
access to social systems, labor market schemes, and public health care, and education services.
The Revised Treaty of Basseterre also links the principle of free movement of persons to an
overall goal of sustainable cultural and economic development in the region. Article 23 recognizes
that the principle of free movement of persons is linked to ensuring a safe and stable society, and
requires states to “provide the enabling legislative, policy and administrative environment needed
to support social relations and cohesion for children, youth, men and women in the Economic Union
Area, with particular attention to the consequences and impact of the free movement of peoples on
shared family responsibilities and economic stability.”92 While CARICOM extends free movement
to specific categories of workers, all OECS nationals enjoy the right to live and work in other OECS
member states. 93 These benefits apply equally in a post-disaster context, where OECS citizens
should have “unimpeded access to the territory of other OECS States.”94
Indeed, both the CARICOM and OECS FMAs were operationalized during the 2017 Atlantic
Hurricane Season, during which time three hurricanes displaced three million people in a single

IOM supra note 14 at 20.
OECS, Revised Treaty of Basseterre, Art. 3 (2010), available at https://perma.cc/U9ER-HA4H.
91 Id. at Art. 12.
92 Id. at Art. 23.
93 Id. at Art. 3(c) & 12.
94 Cantor supra note 47 at 57.
89
90
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month.95 After Hurricane Maria, Trinidad & Tobago used the CARICOM FMA’s 6-month visa-free
stay provision to shelter displaced Dominicans.96 The Antigua, St. Vincent, Grenada and St. Lucia
governments also welcomed Dominicans, making use of the OECS FMA. 97

In some cases,

immigration officials admitted Dominicans without thenational identification documents—
including passports—that are typically required. In these cases, government officials used other
forms of identification, including appearance, accent, and family networks, prioritizing 100%
admission of arriving Dominican nationals, as well as speed of registration and entry. Finally, St.
Lucia also housed prisoners from the British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands after
Hurricane Irma damaged prisons.98

3.2.2. Challenges
The application of Caribbean labor mobility frameworks in post-disaster contexts does pose
challenges. First, immigration officials operating at the border enjoy a high level of discretion. While
this discretion facilitated 100% admission of Dominican nationals after Hurricane Maria, border
officials could also deny entry to disaster displaced persons in the future, especially if nationals were
considered a threat to the public interest.99 Member states may tighten migration policies if the
number of disaster displaced persons in the region swells due to increased adverse climate effects,
or in response to domestic political pressures.
Second, third country nationals who normally fall outside the scope of these free movement
regimes may have enjoyed the opportunity to more easily participate in irregular migration during
the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane season. Both St. Lucia and St. Vincent admitted medical students who
were not covered under the OECS FMA. St. Vincent reportedly lost track of some of these third
country nationals. St. Lucian authorities also faced difficulty distinguishing Haitian nationals from
Dominicans; Dominicans, unlike Haitians, are entitled to indefinite stay in St. Lucia. Going forward

UNFCCC, Warsaw International Mechanism Task Force on Displacement Activites III.1-3 (2018), available at
https://perma.cc/8F22-RQYG.
96 T&T PM Asks Citizens to Welcome Dominicans Devastated by Hurricane Maria, STABROEK NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://perma.cc/3VKN-F4G7.
97 Antigua Prepares for Influx of Dominicans, BARBADOS TODAY (Sept. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/6X2V-N55A.
98 Puerto Rico Opens Arms to Refugee from Irma’s Caribbean Chaos, REUTERS, (Sept. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/8VDHGM5J. Cantor supra note 47 at 58.
99 CARICOM supra note 79 at 34-35.
95
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it will be important to establish a normative framework for the application of Caribbean labor
mobility regimes in a post-disaster context.
In sum, Caribbean islands used the CARICOM and OECS FMAs to assist disaster displaced
persons during the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane season, but application varied based on national context.
As the Executive Director of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency noted,
protection measures for disaster displaced persons “need full consideration within the context of
CARICOM’s broader policy but also individual national government policies.”100 Recently, Latin
American and Caribbean countries agreed on guidance for responses to cross-border displacement
in the context of climate change and disasters with the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action.
The Immigration and Customs Working Group on Disaster—a coalition between the Caribbean
Disaster Emergency Management Agency, CARICOM IMPACS and national immigration
officials—is also aiming to formalize the practices that facilitated movement during the 2017 Atlantic
Hurricane Season, and ensured Caribbean nationals access to entry, resettlement, and contingent
rights. Formalizing best practices may set the Caribbean up to serve as a model to other regions.

4. APPLICABILITY OF FMAS IN OTHER REGIONS
The use of Caribbean Free Movement Agreements (FMAs) during the 2017 Atlantic
Hurricane Season points to broader arguments for leveraging FMAs as a protection framework for
climate-induced migration.

Given that 120 countries worldwide participate in FMAs, the

applicability of FMAs in post-disaster contexts is relevant to regions other than the Caribbean.
Indeed, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the leading intergovernmental initiative on
environmental migration, identifies FMAs as one example of state-led humanitarian protection
measures that can fill the protection gap for disaster displaced people.101 The Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa is currently developing a protocol on the free
CDEMA, Statement by Mr. Ronald Jackson, Executive Director of CDEMA on the recognition of International Day for
Disaster Reduction (Oct. 13, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/DNA7-UWLZ.
101 Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), State-Led, Regional, Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop
Legal Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES’: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE 126, 135 (Simon Berhman &
Avidan Kent eds., 2018); see also Elizabeth Ferris, Governance and Climate Change-Induced Mobility: International and Regional
Frameworks, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 11, 24 (Dimitra Manou et
al. eds., 2017) (noting that FMAs “might well be the most productive means to address future cross-border movements
resulting from the effects of climate change.”).
100
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movement of persons to implement Art. 7(b) of the Agreement establishing IGAD, 102 and may
include protections for climate migrants. Tamara Wood identifies three key benefits of African
FMAs provide to migrants; that is, African FMAs give access to territory, grant status and rights
during stay, and provide opportunities for lasting solutions to disaster displaced persons.103
I will argue that FMAs serve as a useful protection framework for climate migrants for three
reasons: 1) FMAs respond to the complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration; 2) FMAs
build individual and structural resilience; and 3) the expansion of FMAs to account for climateinduced migration is politically feasible. As climate change exacerbates the frequency and intensity
of disaster, increasing the number of displaced people, effective policy responses like FMAs will
become increasingly critical.

i.

FMAs respond to the complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration

Cross-border climate-induced migration is both multi-causal and regional in nature. Climate
migrants may be displaced by, or move due to, a combination of economic, political, and social
factors. Furthermore, as is true of global migration generally, most cross-border climate-induced
migration occurs regionally.104 The variety in cause (drought, sea-level rise, storms, floods, etc.),
type of movement (short term/long term, internal/regional/international), nature of migration
(voluntary versus forced), and the difficulty in establishing a direct causal link between climate
change and migration have all undermined attempts to address the climate-induced migration
protection gap.105 FMAs have the potential to address the gap because they are responsive to the
complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration; these agreements allow for movement
before, during, or after a sudden or slow onset event, thereby increasing mobility options regardless
of whether movement was forced or voluntary, is temporary or permanent, or directly caused by a
climate-related event.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Agreement Establishing IGAD, Art. 7(b) (1996).
Tamara Wood, The Role of Free Movement of Persons Agreements in Addressing Disaster Displacement: A Study of
Africa (May 2019), available at https://perma.cc/P8WW-CWDG.
104 Diego Acosta, Global Migration Law and Regional Free Movement: Compliance and Adjudication - the Case of South
America, 111 AJIL Unbound 159, 159 (2017).
105 Elin Jakobsson, Norm Formalization in International Policy Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis, in ‘CLIMATE
REFUGEES’: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE 52, 62 (Simon Berhman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018).
102
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FMAs can be responsive to migrant needs in the absence of sharply delineated causal factors.
Notwithstanding whether cross-border displacement was prompted by a sudden- and/or slow-onset
event, economic or environmental drivers, FMAs respond not to the root cause of displacement but
to its effects. Because the benefits of FMAs are conferred based on nationality, climate migrants can
access territory, safety, and even labor markets without having to prove that they are climate
migrants. This makes FMAs a particularly useful policy intervention because of the multi-causal
nature of climate-induced migration, and the difficulty of distinguishing climate migrants from
other categories of people on the move.106
FMAs sidestep the necessity of determining whether movement was forced or voluntary and
whether environmental causes are the primary driver of migration, issues that undermine other
proposals for strengthening the normative framework for cross-border climate migrants.107 FMAs
allow migrants to avoid the legal burden “climate refugees” would face in seeking protection under
international refugee law or any other multilateral convention modeled on the 1951 Refugee
Convention by having to prove they are seeking asylum solely based on climate impacts.
The proposal to endow climate migrants with climate passports may also be difficult to
operationalize due to causality.

The German Advisory Council on Global Change therefore

recommends identifying island states that are threatened by territorial loss, and then granting
climate passports to citizens of those states without determining whether each individual was
moving because of climate change.108 Although this may work for island states, the climate passport
may be less suitable outside of the SIDS context where climate impacts will not lead to complete loss
of territory. Thus it would still be necessary to determine who is eligible for the passport within a
given country on an individual basis.

By granting mobility privileges based on nationality

independent of climate change as a driver, FMAs avoid the issue of causality, as well as the problem

See Wood supra note 102 at 27.
Ferris supra note 101 at 23.
108 German Advisory Council on Global Change, Just & In Time Climate Policy: Four Initiatives for a Fair
Transformation (Aug. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/FQ5E-R23D.
106
107
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of privileging climate migrants over other categories of migrants, including those migrating for
economic reasons.109
FMAs also provide a regional response to a regional challenge. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 63%
of emigrants remain within the region, 110 and 80% remain within the continent.111 Fifty-five percent
of cross-border movement is intra-regional in Europe and Central Asia,112 while almost a third of
migrants remain within the Middle East and North Africa, 113 and South Asia. 114 Cross-border
regional movement is especially common in countries that share a common border.115 FMAs can
capture this short-range cross-border movement.
Furthermore, because environmental impacts vary across regions, regional responses to
managing migration may also be more appropriate.116 FMAs can be tailored to meet regionallyspecific needs. FMAs allow for flexibility in moving, placing no restrictions on migrants’ ability to
return home, or re-enter host countries. Most climate migrants would prefer to stay in place, with
evidence showing that the majority of migrants return home when possible.117 The fact that FMAs
facilitate movement intra-regionally may also allow migrants to relocate to countries that share
similar cultures and values. This might lessen the adverse impacts of displacement when crossborder migration is the only viable adaptation option.
ii.

FMAs build structural and individual resilience

Economic factors generally play a larger role in determining migration outcomes than
environmental drivers. 118 The difficulty of detangling economic and environmental drivers in
migration decisions has stymied attempts to create solutions that support climate migrants in

109 See Benoît Mayer, Critical Perspective on the Identification of ‘Environmental Refugees’ as a Category of Human Rights
Concern, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 28, 35-37 (Dimitra Manou et
al., ed., 2017).
110 WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 33 (2nd ed. 2011)
111 African Union, Evaluation of the African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa (African Union, 2016).
112 UNESCO supra note 55 at xx.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 M. Beine and Ch. Parsons, Climate Factors as Determinants of International Migration, IRES de l’Université
Catholique de Louvain Discussion Paper 2012–2 18 (2012).
116 See PDD supra note 100 at 137.
117 LM Hunter & RA McLeman, Migration in the Context of Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights
from Analogues, 1 WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REV. CLIMATE CHANGE; see also Perch-Nielsen et al., Exploring the Link Between
Climate Change and Migration, 91 CLIMATE CHANGE 381 (2008).
118 Barnett supra note 29 at 6.
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particular. Migrants rarely move due to environmental factors alone, thus invalidating solutions
targeted only at climate migrants. However, the weight of economic drivers in environmental
migration presents an opportunity for climate-induced migration policy solutions to focus on
building economic capacity. FMAs, which increase economic resilience at both the structural and
individual level, can reduce the need for migration in the first place.
Migration can serve as a development strategy. African states, for example, supported the
Global Compact on Migration because of the need to mainstream “migration into development
strategies that include gainful employment, remittances and financial inclusion and the circulation
of professionals of all skill levels, and arrangements for free movement.”119 In the Pacific, Australia’s
Seasonal Worker Program originally aimed to promote economic development in the Pacific Islands,
but is now used to facilitate adaptation. 120 FMAs can create an enabling framework for capturing
migration-development co-benefits.
Moreover, although economists have focused on South-North migratory flows, research on
the international economic integration indicates that FMAs do have important economic benefits
intra-regionally. 121 The EU, for example, has witnessed significant gains through its regional
economic integration scheme. A number of studies report that the Schengen area, which allows for
passport free cross-border travel and supports the EU’s single market of free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital, confers economic benefits to participating States.122 Bilateral net trade
increases by 0.09% annually when two countries participate in the Schengen area.123 Intra-European
trade reached more than €5 trillion in 2014, and has increased over time. Moreover, the increase in
immigration associated with the Schengen area has a positive impact on trade; a 1% increase in
immigration is connected to a 0.09% increase in imports.124 A 2011 study showed that the Schengen
area “significantly decreases the trade frictions between trade partners and facilitates cross- country

African Union, Draft Common African Position on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 5
(Oct. 2017), available at https://perma.cc/4PZ3-W9HC.
120 Richard Bedford et al., Managed Temporary Labour Migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia and New Zealand in
the Early Twenty-First Century, 48 AUSTL. GEOGRAPHY 37–57 (2017).
121 PETER ROBSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION (1980).
122 European Parliament, The Economic Impact of Suspending Schengen (Mar. 2016), https://perma.cc/8Z69-U38E.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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trade integration.” 125 More research on the benefits of international economic integration is
warranted.
While the EU serves as an example of the economic benefits of FMAs, economic inequality
between States can hinder the efficacy of regional integration schemes. 126 The Southern Africa
Development Community’s (SADC) goal of full free movement by 2005 was scaled back, for
example, due to concerns that economic disparity within the region would lead to mass migration
to South Africa.127 SADC’s later protocol eliminated references to free movement, and replaced a
guaranteed right to entry with state commitment to facilitating entry, residence and establishment.128
FMAs may also facilitate movement to areas that are similarly environmentally vulnerable.129
Yet FMAs’ ability to achieve economic gains through integration can lead to increased resilience,
improving countries’ ability to withstand disasters, and reducing migrant exposure when moving
to areas with similar geographic vulnerability.
Migration can also increase economic resilience at a community and individual level.
Remittances play a key role in increasing community resilience in countries of origin, 130 with
payments supporting investments in housing, health, education, and daily subsistence needs.131 A
U.N. University study in the Pacific found that remittances can help households adapt to climate
change impacts.132
Noneconomic exchange also increases community resilience. When migrants are secure in
their ability to move between their home and host countries, as FMAs allow, they return often,
enhancing the adaptive capacity of their communities of origin by increasing understanding of

Id.
UNESCO supra note 55 at xxiii.
127 J.O. Oucho & J. Crush, Contra Free Movement: South Africa and the SADC Migration Protocols, 48 AFRICA TODAY
139-146 (2001); Jonathan Martens, Moving Freely on the African Continent: The Experiences of ECOWAS and SADC with Free
Movement Protocols, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 349, 359 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007).
128 The 1997 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development
Community, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone (Jan. 1997).
129 See Black et al., Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447, available at https://perma.cc/89T4-X43A (noting that
people are equally likely to migrate to places that are environmentally vulnerable as they are to emigrate out of these
places).
130 Barnett supra note 29 at 22.
131 Nicholas Van Hear, ”I Went as Far as My Money Would Take Me,” in FORCED MIGRATION & GLOBAL PROCESSES
125, 137 (François Crépeau & Delphine Nakache eds., 2006).
132 United Nations University, Climate Change & Migration in the Pacific: Links, attitudes, and future scenarios in
Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati, available at https://perma.cc/NZ8F-FDT6.
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climate change risks and responses, strengthening social networks, and transferring goods and new
skills.133 The majority of migrants of working age participate in the labor market, and migration can
improve income and living standards.134 Circular, temporary and permanent migration can also
expand livelihood options.135
iii.

FMAs are more politically feasible than a global multilateral agreement & can be
adapted to the climate context

Though there are certainly exceptions, expanding FMAs to account for climate-induced
migration is politically feasible in many places. Neighboring states are more likely to share similar
concerns and thus can reach consensus more quickly than in a global multilateral process. 136
Additionally, regional agreements are easier to achieve because fewer states are involved than at a
global multilateral level, and regions may demonstrate greater levels of mutual trust.137 For these
reasons, regional solutions to climate-induced migration provide an important protection stop-gap
while the international community works to deal with the issue.138
Cross-border migration is transnational by definition, and cooperation is possible at the
regional level in the current political climate. 139 While global multilateral agreements on migration
prove difficult because of divergent interests between sending and receiving countries and national
security concerns, states have responded to environmental mobility challenges regionally.140 Some
states outside the Caribbean region have signaled a willingness to leverage FMAs in the climate
context. African States, for example, “have recognised the broader potential of free movement
agreements as well – noting their potential to provide alternative pathways to durable solutions for

Barnett supra note 29 at 23.
Michelle Leighton & Meredith Byrne, With Millions Displaced by Climate Change or Extreme Weather, Is There a
Role for Labor Migration Pathways, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/GCA6-GSKB.
135 Can Free-Movement Agreements Help People Displaced by Climate Change & Disaster, KANDOR CTR. FOR INT’L
REFUGEE L. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/24X8-67LJ.
136 PDD supra note 100 at 137.
137 UNESCO supra note 55 at xiv.
138 PDD supra note 100 at 137.
139 AOIFE MCMAHON, THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN MIGRATION CONTROL: THE LEGITIMACY GAP AND MOVES TOWARDS A
REGIONAL MODEL 221 (2017).
140 UNESCO supra note 55 at xiii.
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refugeesi and contribute to improved peace and security within the region.” 141 The EU has also
demonstrated readiness to use its FMA to facilitate movement for EU citizens because of disasters.142
Practitioners and scholars have supported a regional approach to migration management,
claiming that States will more likely abrogate their authority at the regional level, and are more
inclined to negotiate with similarly-situated States.143 Regional arrangements can result in more
even distribution of benefits between sending and receiving countries, in comparison to bilateral
agreements, which tend to favor the receiving country.144 FMAs present a legal framework through
which regional management can operate.
Requiring fewer States to buy-in than a global multilateral convention, FMAs can also be
more readily adapted to the demands of climate-induced migration. One aspect of reform would
need to be the inclusion of social citizenship. Past FMAs have demonstrated that granting entry
without access to citizenship or social benefits can trap migrants in a status as second-rate citizens.
The Compact of Free Association with Palau, Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands,
for example, allows visa-free entry into the U.S. but not provide access to citizenship or federal
benefits. This makes accessing state-sponsored health care difficult. 145 FMAs should come with
“regional citizenship” that guarantees economic, social, and political rights” to circumvent
discrimination against foreign nationals and discourage movement.” 146 Given that few FMAs
currently guarantee regional citizenship, these frameworks would need to be redesigned to fully be
protective frameworks. FMAs would also need to protect against forcible return.147 Many FMAs
prohibit mass expulsion, cautioning that individual cases for deportation be considered on their own
merits. However, provisions that limit state discretion to suspend FMAs or the rights of migrants
would add further protection. Re-designing FMAs to fully address climate-induced migration
remains more easily achieved at the regional versus the global level.

141 Kenya Embraces the IGAD Regional Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON
DEVELOPMENT (20 February 2018), https://perma.cc/R92B-XLXC.
142 UNGA, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, A/71/728, para. 32.
143 See e.g., McMahon supra note 140 at 10; Benoît Mayer, Environmental Migration: Prospects for a Regional
Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region, 16 Asia-Pacific J. Env’t. L. 73, 92-93 (2013).
144 UNESCO supra note 55 at xv.
145 See Jacob Appel et al., Hawaii’s COFA Islanders: Improving Health Access and Outcomes (Jan. 2017),
https://perma.cc/GQ7P-HQGU.
146 UNESCO supra note 55 at xxiv.
147 See Wood supra note 102 at 43.
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5. CONCLUSION
Climate change exacerbates environmental migration. Extreme weather events, including
frequent and severe storms and drought, have already displaced millions of people worldwide. As
climate change intensifies these extreme weather events, an increasing number of climate migrants
will need to relocate either within their countries or abroad. The majority of climate-induced
migration will occur within national borders. However, climate migrants from SIDS and lowcapacity states are especially at risk given that their ability to respond to disaster is limited.
FMAs provided a range of protective measures to Caribbean people displaced during the
2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season. Two Caribbean FMAs:
1. Granted disaster displaced persons a right of entry in other islands;
2. Supported the waiver of travel document requirements where documents had been
lost or damaged;
3. Granted indefinite stays in some cases, facilitating permanent resettlement; and
4. Gave access to foreign labor markets through a mutual recognition of skills scheme
and/or a waiver of work permit requirements.
These benefits were critical given that international law guarantees no right of entry, work, or
resettlement to people displaced across borders by disaster.
Given that 120 countries worldwide participate in FMAs, FMAs could be useful in other
regional contexts. Adapting FMAs to address climate-induced migration would be an important
intervention given that no governing framework for climate-induced migration yet exists, and
climate migrants enjoy no legal status under international law. FMAs are particularly well-suited
to address the climate-induced migration protection gap because they grant access to territory and
safety regardless of the drivers of movement, which are often difficult to disaggregate. FMAs also
provide a regional response to a regional challenge, build economic resilience at the structural and
individual level, and are more easily amended than global multilateral agreements.
Recent international processes such as the Global Compact on Migration, the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the United Nations Framework on Climate Change
have underscored the importance of climate-induced migration, and advanced recommendations
for closing the protection gap. Given the utility of FMAs as a protection stop-gap, FMAs should be
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included in the suite of options used to address climate-induced migration in the absence of a
governing legal framework.
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